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Abstract
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where heteroge-
neous rms post wage/tenure contracts and risk-averse workers, both em-
ployed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Di¤erent rms,
even those with the same productivity, typically o¤er di¤erent contracts.
Equilibrium nds workers never quit from higher productivity rms to
lower productivity rms, but turnover is ine¢ ciently low as employees
with large tenures at low productivity rms may reject job o¤ers from
more productive rms. A worker who quits to a more productive rm
may take a wage cut in anticipation of better wage promotion prospects.
Wages within a rm might also increase by a discrete amount at the end
of an initial probationaryspell.
Keywords: wage/tenure contracts, on-the-job search, heterogeneous
rms
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Wage/Tenure Contracts with Heterogeneous Firms
For the typical worker, life in the labor market is full of change. While employed
a worker may change employer, or move to unemployment, whereas a worker when
unemployed may get a job or become a non-participant. Further, the wages faced
continue to change through time. Investigating how and why these changes occur
during the lives of workers has been the focus of a great deal of work during the last
twenty years. Indeed, it has become a major element of modern labor economics.
Within this context three stylized facts are generally agreed upon. First, a typical
worker changes jobs several times during his/her lifetime and a signicant percentage
of job changes involve no interim unemployment. Clearly, on-the-job search by
workers is a common phenomenon. Second, at least for younger workers, the wage
received by a worker is positively correlated with job tenure and total work experience.
Of course, identifying by how much a workers wage increase is due to tenure and how
much is due to experience is no small task. Indeed, there is a large and ourishing
literature on this topic (see, for example, Altonji and Skakotko (1987), Topel (1991),
Dustman and Meghir (2005)). Finally, job-to- job changes typically involve a jump
in the wage received. Although most wage jumps are positive, there is a signicant
number of negative jumps where wages decrease in a job-to-job change.
Among those who have tried to explain these stylized facts, two big ideas have
dominated. First, most have used the seminal work of Becker (1964) and Mincer
(1974) in which workers accumulate both general and rm specic human capital as
they work for employers. Second, a number have used the arguments proposed by
Jovanovic (1979,1984) that when a rm hires a worker the quality of the match is
unknown. The participants, however, learn about the quality through time. There
is now a signicant and insightful literature that have used these two ideas to explain
the stylized facts presented above (recent studies include Kambourov and Manovskii
(2007) and Moscarini (2005)). An objective of the present study is to take an alter-
native approach where both human capital accumulation and learning play no role
by assumption. We construct and analyze an equilibrium search model of the labor
market where in equilibrium the model constructed predicts, amongst other things,
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the stylized facts described above.
Recent years have seen a number of signicant developments in the study of
equilibrium in labor markets where rms post wages and workers, both unemployed
and employed, search for better jobs. Perhaps the most used framework in this area
was developed by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), hereafter B=M: Within the B=M
framework it can be shown that even if both workers and rms are homogeneous,
the equilibrium distribution of wages is non-degenerate. As workers are assumed to
search while employed, the dispersed wage distribution implies an employed worker
may change jobs as new job opportunities arrive. Hence, in equilibrium there is job-
to-job movements by workers. This, and other resulting predictions, has led to a
great deal of empirical work.
Three restrictions play a crucial role in the B=M framework: (A) employed work-
ers receive job o¤ers as well as unemployed workers, (B) employers do not respond
to o¤ers from other rms received by its employees, and (C) the o¤ers made by any
employer can be completely described by a positive real number - the wage it is
willing to pay any employee at any tenure.
Restriction (A) appears harmless in that it is satised in most labor markets.
Restriction (B) is clearly not satised in the academic labor market in the US, but
may well hold in other types of labor markets - its hard to tell. Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002a, 2002b) and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) replace restriction
(B) by assuming that if an employee does contact another rm, the two rms (the
workers current employer and the rm contacted) partake in a Bertrand wage bidding
contest for the services of the worker. The rm with the higher productivity wins
this contest. If the workers current employer is less productive than the other rm,
the worker changes employer. Otherwise the worker stays put but may still enjoy a
wage increase. In this framework rm heterogeneity not only induces wage dispersion
across rms, but there is also within-rm wage dispersion where each employees
wage depends on outside o¤ers received in the past. Thus, within-rm wages are also
positively correlated with tenure.
In a recent contribution Burdett and Coles (2003) (hereafter B=C) extends the
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B=M analysis by instead dropping restriction (C) while maintaining restrictions (A)
and (B). In particular, B=C assumes rms o¤er contracts where the wage paid de-
pends upon a workers tenure. Given workers are risk-averse, it was shown that the
wage/tenure contract which maximizes rm prots implies the wage paid increases
with tenure. Further, in equilibrium di¤erent rms o¤er di¤erent contracts - some
more desirable to workers than others. This implies that employed workers who re-
ceive outside o¤ers may change jobs. A useful interpretation of this outcome is that
rms implement an internal promotion scheme, where (otherwise identical) employees
are promoted by seniority. Thus more senior workers are higher up in the rms wage
hierarchy. By promising a junior employee higher wages in the future, an internal
promotion scheme reduces a junior employees incentive to quit. The employer can
then set low wages at short tenures and so extract the junior employees search rents.
Restriction B implies the rm ignores employee outside o¤ers; i.e., a rm never pro-
motes a junior worker over equally productive, more senior, employees. Instead an
employee who receives a preferred o¤er is simply allowed to leave. Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2004) argue such a rigid pay structure may be prot maximizing as outside
o¤er matching increases the return to on-the-job search and so encourages greater
on-the-job search activity. With on-the-job search and no outside o¤er matching,
a company wage structure which promotes by seniority (or tenure) weakens worker
quit incentives and so increases rm prot.
In the present study we extend the B=C study by assuming that rms have
di¤erent productivities. Allowing for rm heterogeneity with search frictions and on-
the-job search leads to a rich set of possible equilibrium outcomes. Here we mention
four. First as in B=C, di¤erent rms with the same productivity typically o¤er dif-
ferent wage/tenure contracts. This implies job to job movements by workers between
rms with the same productivity as well as between rms with di¤erent productiv-
ities. Second, we show that more productive rms make more desirable o¤ers than
less productive rms. This implies workers never quit from more productive rms
to less productive rms. Nevertheless, we shall show employees with large tenures
at low productive rms may reject outside job o¤ers from more productive rms.
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Thus, turnover is ine¢ cient. This arises as hiring rms o¤er wages below marginal
product, while rms design wage tenure contracts to reduce employee quit incentives.
Together these factors imply quit turnover is too low - too many employees remain in
low productivity rms. Third, if a worker quits a rm to a more productive one it may
involve a reduction in wage. This occurs as a worker does not only compare current
wages when considering an outside job o¤er - internal promotion prospects also play
an important role. More productive rms o¤er better internal prospects which can
more than compensate for a lower initial wage. Finally, we show that although wages
increase with tenure at a rm, this increase may not be smooth. In particular we
identify market equilibria where the distribution of contract o¤ers has a mass point
in the interior of its support. A numerical example establishes that higher produc-
tivity rms might then o¤er a contract with an initial probationary spell. During the
probationary period wages are low (but increasing). On completion of this spell, the
workers wage "jumps" up by a discrete amount.
In the next Section the basic framework is outlined and the optimal search strategy
of a worker is described. The optimal wage/tenure contract of a representative type i
rm is derived. We then show that in equilibrium the wage/tenure contracts o¤ered
by all type i rms can be fully described by a baseline salary scale. Sections 3 and
4 describe market equilibrium, where from Section 4 onwards we restrict attention
to only two types of rms. Section 5 provides numerical examples to illustrate the
richness of possible equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
1.THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
Many aspects of the labor market model presented below are kept as simple as
possible to ease the burden of exposition. Generalizations in several ways is straight-
forward but would complicate the presentation.
Time is continuous and only steady states are considered. A unit mass of both
workers and rms participate in a labor market. Workers are homogeneous but there
are n types of rms. A type i rm generates revenue pi per unit of time from each
worker it employs, i = 1; 2; ::n, where p1 < p2::: < pn: Proportion i of all rms are
type i.
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Workers are either unemployed or employed and obtain new job o¤ers at Poisson
rate ; independent of their employment status. Any job o¤er is fully described by
the wage contract o¤ered by the rm. This species the wage the worker receives
as a function of tenure at that rm, i.e., an o¤er is a function w(:)  0 dened for
all tenures t  0: All new hires are o¤ered the same contract and this contract is
binding. There is no recall should a worker quit or reject a job o¤er. For simplicity
assume rms and workers have a zero rate of time preference.
The objective of any rm is to maximize steady state ow prot. Workers are
strictly risk averse and nitely lived, where any workers life is described by an ex-
ponential random variable with parameter  > 0: Thus workers discount the future
at rate :  also describes the ow of new (unemployed) workers into the market and
so ensures a unit mass of workers in a steady state. The objective of any worker is
to maximize total expected lifetime utility. Unemployed workers obtain b per unit of
time and p1 > b > 0: Following previous studies that investigate contracts between
employers and workers, we assume there is no capital market where a worker can
borrow or save.
Workers
As a worker cannot borrow or save, a worker who obtains income w  0 at any
instant of time obtains ow utility u(w) by immediately consuming it:We impose the
following restriction.
A1: u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice di¤erentiable and
lim
w!0+
u(w) =  1 :
A1 is useful as it ensures the constraint w  0 is never binding in an optimal contract.
As discussed further in B=C, we could relax A1 and instead assume the ow value of
being unemployed is su¢ ciently large.
An unemployed workers expected lifetime payo¤ is indicated by Vu: Given an
optimal quit strategy, let V (tjw(:)) denote a workers expected lifetime payo¤ when
employed with tenure t at a rm o¤ering contract w(:): Thus, V0 = V (0jw(:)) denotes
the value of accepting a job o¤er w(:): As rms may o¤er di¤erent contracts, let
F (V0) denote the proportion of rms in the market whose job o¤er, if accepted,
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yields a worker an expected lifetime payo¤ no greater than V0. Search is random in
that given a job o¤er, F (V0) is the probability the o¤er has value no greater than V0.
Let V and V denote the inmum and supremum of this distribution function.
Standard arguments imply the expected payo¤ to an unemployed worker, Vu;can
be written as
Vu = u(b) + 
Z V
Vu
[V0   Vu]dF (V0): (1)
An unemployed worker accepts a job o¤er if and only if it has value V0  Vu:
Now consider the value of being employed with contract w(:): As formally estab-
lished in B=C, an optimal contract implies it is never optimal for a worker to quit
into unemployment.1 Thus, given an optimal contract, standard arguments imply
V (tjw(:)) is given by
V (tjw(:))  dV (tjw(:))
dt
= u(w(t)) + 
Z V
V (tj:w())
[V0   V (tjw(:))]dF (V0): (2)
Note, an employed worker with tenure t quits on receiving an outside o¤er if and
only if the value of that o¤er V0 > V (tjw(:)): As a worker may also die at any
time, a worker, employed at a rm with tenure s and contract w(:); leaves at rate
+[1 F (V (sjw(:))]: This implies the probability a new hire will still be an employee
with tenure t can be written as
 (tjw(:)) = e 
R t
0 [+(1 F (V (sjw(:)))]ds: (3)
Firms
LetG(V ) denote the steady-state number of workers in the economy with expected
lifetime utility strictly less than V: Suppose a type i rm posts w(:) and recall V0 =
V (0jw(0)) is the value of accepting this job o¤er: If V0 < Vu all potential employees
1Suppose an optimal contract implies the worker quits into unemployment at tenure T  0: Thus
at tenure T , the rms continuation prot is zero and the worker obtains Vu: The same contract but
which instead o¤ers w(t) = b for all tenures t  T is strictly prot increasing - the worker obtains
the same payo¤ Vu at T but, by not quitting, the rms continuation payo¤ is strictly positive (as
b < pi). This latter contract then makes greater expected prot which contradicts optimality of the
original contract.
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prefer being unemployed to accepting this job o¤er and so such an o¤er yields zero
prot. Suppose instead V0  Vu: G(V0) then describes this rms hiring rate and its
steady state ow prot can be written as

i = [G(V0)]
Z 1
0
 (tjw(:))[pi   w(t)]dt

;
Note, the rms steady state ow prot equals its hiring rate G(V0) multiplied by
the expected prot per new hire.
To determine the contract that maximizes 
i we use a two step procedure. First,
we determine a rms wage/tenure contract that maximizes its expected prot ow
conditional on o¤ering a new hire lifetime payo¤ V0: Such a contract is termed an
optimal contract. Assuming such an optimal contract exists, let w
i
(tjV0) denote it
and let 
i
(0jV0) denote the rms maximized payo¤ per new hire. A type i rms
steady-state ow prots can then be written as

i (V0) = G(V0)

i
(0jV0):
A rm is optimization problem then reduces to choosing a starting payo¤ V0 to
maximize 
i (V0):
A useful preliminary insight is that because the arrival rate of o¤ers is independent
of a workers employment status, an unemployed worker will always accept a contract
which o¤ers w(t) = b for all t: Further, as b < pi by assumption, a rm can always
obtain strictly positive prot by o¤ering this contract. Thus without loss of generality
we assume (a) all rms make strictly positive prot; 
i > 0; (b) V  Vu (as an o¤er
V0 < Vu attracts no workers and so makes zero prot), and (c) V < u(pn)= (as no
rm pays a worker more than the workers expected value). To simplify further the
exposition, we impose the following restriction on F .
A2: F has a connected support [V ; V ]  [Vu; u(pn)=]:
Unlike B=C we do not rule out mass points in F: Indeed, a surprising feature of
the analysis is that equilibrium may yield mass points in the interior of the support
of F .
Given productivity pi; a rms optimal contracting problem is formally dened as
max
w(:)
Z 1
0
 (tjw(:))[pi   w(t)]dt (4)
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subject to (a) w(:)  0; (b) V (0jw(:)) = V0 and (c) the optimal quit strategies of
workers which determine  (as dened by (3)). Theorem 1 describes the optimal
contract.
Theorem 1
For any F satisfying A2 and any starting payo¤V0 2 [V ; V 1i ) with V 1i dened by
(9); the optimal wage-tenure contract wi and corresponding worker and rm payo¤s
V i and 

i are solutions to the dynamical system fw; V;g where
(a) V and  evolve according to the di¤erential equations
dV
dt
=  u0(w)d
dt
(5)
[ + (1  F )]  d
dt
= [pi   w]; (6)
(b) w is determined by
u(w) + u0(w)[pi   w   [ + (1  F )]] = V   
Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx; (7)
subject to the boundary conditions:
(i) the initial condition V (0) = V0; and
(ii) limt!1fw(t); V (t);(t)g = (w1i ; V 1i ;1i ); where
w1i = maxfw; pig (8)
V 1i = u(w
1
i ) + 
Z V
V1i
[V0   V 1i ]dF (V0) (9)
1i = (pi   w1i )=: (10)
and w is the solution to u(w)= = V :
Proof
See Appendix A.
Unlike B=C; the conditions described in Theorem 1 allow mass points in F: The
structures, however, are closely related. Indeed di¤erentiating (7) with respect to t
yields, after some simplication, the di¤erential equation for w
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 u00(w)
u0(w)2
dw
dt
= F 0(V ) (11)
as derived in B=C: Thus (7) is the integrated solution of that di¤erential equation: As
discussed in detail in B=C; the optimal contract is the saddle path to the di¤erential
equation system (5), (6),(11) for {w; V;g where (w1i ; V 1i ;1i ) is the limiting sta-
tionary point: That saddle path determines the wage paid w, the value of employment
V and the rms continuation prot  at each tenure t; and the initial condition (i)
ensures it yields value V0 at t = 0: As equilibrium F may contain mass points, (11)
does not always apply. Instead (7) applies for any F and so identies the (discrete)
change in optimal w across mass points.
Theorem 1 also describes the limiting wage w1i at long tenures. Note that w is the
solution to u(w)= = V and, in equilibrium, will describe the highest wage paid in the
market. (8) implies high productivity rms - those with pi > w - have w1i = w; i.e.,
high productivity rms raise wages with tenure until they match the highest wage in
the market. Conversely, low productivity rms - those with pi < w - have w1i = pi;
i.e., low productivity rms raise wages with tenure until they pay marginal product.
Figure 1 depicts the optimal contract o¤ered by the type i rm which o¤ers the
lowest starting payo¤ of any type i rm (denoted V i): If V i < V
1
i (which is true
in equilibrium), the conditions of Theorem 1 imply the wage paid increases with
tenure and converges to w1i : We refer to this optimal contract as the type i baseline
salary scale, and denote it as wi(t): Theorem 1 also yields a corresponding path for
V; denoted by Vi(:) and continuation prot ; denoted i(:): As the wage paid along
the baseline salary scale increases with tenure, then the value of employment, Vi(t);
is also increasing in tenure. Note, if there is a mass point in F; then the conditions
of Theorem 1 imply w increases by a discrete amount across that mass point, while
V (:) remains continuous (but it is not continuously di¤erentiable). In Figure 1, F is
assumed to be di¤erentiable.
Optimality of the type i baseline salary scale yields a major simplication. Sup-
pose a type i rm instead wishes to o¤er starting payo¤ V0 2 [V i; V 1i ]: Optimality
of the type i baseline salary scale implies the optimal contract yielding V0; is the
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Figure 1: Type i baseline salary scale
starting point t0 on the baseline salary scale where Vi(t0) = V0; and corresponding
wage payments wi(t0 + t) along the baseline salary scale at tenures t  0:
With homogeneous rms, B=C shows that all starting points t0  0 are o¤ered
in equilibrium. This does not necessarily occur with heterogeneous rms. For low
productivity rms, those with pi < w; an upper bound exists, say Ti as depicted in
Figure 1; such that all type i rms only o¤er starting points t0  Ti. To reduce
ine¢ cient quits, type i rms raise wages with tenure and pay marginal product at
(arbitrarily) long tenures. Equilibrium, however, implies a nite upper bound Ti <1
exists on starting o¤ers as o¤ering w(:) = pi for all t yields zero prot.
2. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
A moments reection establishes that workers do not care about the particular
wage tenure contract o¤ered, only the value V0 obtained by accepting it. To proceed
we need to transform the equations obtained above into value space (V ):
Recall that at salary point t0 on baseline salary scale i; the worker (a) earns current
wage w = wi(t0); (b) enjoys expected lifetime value V = Vi(t0) while (c) the rm
obtains continuation prot  = i(t0): As Vi(:) is a continuous increasing function
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of t0; its inverse function, denoted by bti(V ); is well dened for all V 2 [V i; V 1i ] :
Note, bti describes the salary point on the type i baseline salary scale which yields
lifetime payo¤ V: i(bti(V )) then describes the rms continuation prot given the
worker enjoys current value V; and we let bi(V ) denote this payo¤. Similarly denebwi(V )  wi(bti(V )) which then describes the wage paid by a type i rm given the
worker enjoys current value V: Claim 1 now identies bi(V ) and bwi(V ).
Claim 1
Fix an F satisfying A2. For V 2 [V ; V 1i ]; bi(V ) evolves according to the di¤er-
ential equation
dbi
dV
=   1
u0( bwi) (12)
subject to the boundary condition bi = 1i at V = V 1i ; and bwi satises
u( bwi) + u0( bwi)[pi   bwi   [ + (1  F )]bi] = V    Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx: (13)
Further, bti is the solution to the di¤erential equation
dbti
dV
=
1
u0( bwi)[pi   bwi   [ + (1  F )]bi]
with initial condition bti(V i) = 0 and, as bti is strictly increasing for V < V 1i ; implies
[pi   bwi   [ + (1  F )]bi] > 0 for all V < V 1i :
Proof
Claim 1 follows directly from Theorem 1 and the denitions of bti; bwi; bi.
When F is di¤erentiable, (13) implies bwi evolves according to
d bwi
dV
=

u0( bwi)
 u00( bwi)

F 0(V )bih
pi   bwi   [ + (1  F )]bii : (14)
The approach below uses (14) and (12) to jointly determine bwi; bi whenever F is
di¤erentiable, but uses (13) to determine bwi whenever F is not di¤erentiable; i.e.
across mass points.
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By construction, a type i rms optimized steady state ow prot by o¤ering
V0 2 [V ; V 1i ] is

i (V0) = G(V0)bi(V0):
We can now formally dene a Market Equilibrium.
AMarket Equilibrium requires identifying the following:
(1) A distribution of job o¤ers by rm type i; denoted Fi(V ); where F (V ) = iiFi(V )
satises A2;
(2) optimal job search by workers,
(3) a distribution of expected lifetime payo¤s G consistent with o¤ers F and steady
state turnover and
(4) a steady-state prot condition where for all rm types:

i (V0) = 
i > 0 if dFi(V0) > 0;

i (V0)  
i; otherwise,
(15)
The denition of a Market Equilibrium requires the constant prot condition; that
all o¤ers with dFi > 0 make the same prot 
i; while all other o¤ers make no greater
prot. We begin with some standard results.
Lemma 1
A Market Equilibrium implies:
(a) V = Vu;
(b) steady state unemployment U = =(+ );
(c) 1 G and F do not have a mass point at V :
Proof
Lemma 1(a) is a well-known result; the lowest value o¤er in the market equals the
value of unemployment. The proof uses simple contradiction arguments : V < Vu is
inconsistent with strictly positive prot (rms o¤ering starting value V0 < Vu make
zero prot), while V > Vu is inconsistent with the constant prot condition (o¤ering
V0 = V is dominated by o¤ering V0 = Vu as both o¤ers only attract the unemployed
and o¤ering Vu < V generates greater prot per hire). Lemma 1(b) follows as un-
employed workers accept their rst job o¤er and thus steady state turnover implies
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 =(+ )U: Lemma 1c is an important technical result which also holds in B/C; we
prove it in Appendix A. This completes the proof.
We next show a Market Equilibrium implies higher productivity rms o¤er con-
tracts with higher starting payo¤s. Thus, workers never quit from a high to a low
productivity rm. Lemma 2 establishes the necessary preliminary step.
Lemma 2
For any i; j with pi < pj; and for any V0 2 [V ; V 1i ):
(i) bwi(V0) > bwj(V0)
(ii)
dbi(V0)
dV0
<
dbj(V0)
dV0
< 0:
Proof
See Appendix.
Lemma 2(i) states that for the same (starting) value V0; a higher productivity rm
pays a lower initial wage than a lower productivity rm: This result occurs as higher
productivity rms o¤er higher wages at long tenures and so, to yield the same V0; the
higher productivity rms pay a lower (starting) wage. Lemma 2(ii) establishes that
for the same (starting) value V0; the marginal loss in prot by increasing V0 is strictly
smaller for the higher productivity rm. This reects that a worker with a higher
expected lifetime payo¤ has a lower quit rate and the marginal return to retaining
that worker is greater for the high productivity rm. Theorem 2 now establishes the
segmentation result.
Theorem 2
A market equilibrium implies V i = V i+1; i.e. the support of F can be partitioned
into n sets, where type i rms o¤er V0 2 [V i 1; V i] with V  V 1  V 2  ::::  V n =
V :
Proof
A rm with productivity p = pi chooses V0 to maximize

i (V0) = G(V0)bi(V0):
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First note that higher productivity rms must make strictly greater prot per hire
for the same V0 (they can o¤er the optimal contract of a lower productivity rm and
enjoy strictly higher revenues). Hence for any increasingG(:); Lemma 2(ii) implies the
marginal return to increasing V0 is strictly greater for a higher productivity rm. Thus
optimality implies a higher productivity rm chooses a higher V0: Connectedness of
F (assumption A2) then implies the Theorem. This completes the proof of Theorem
2.
Identifying a Market Equilibrium now reduces to solving a sequence of constant
prot conditions
G(V0)bi(V0) = 
i for V0 2 [V i 1; V i]
with G consistent with steady state turnover. As characterizing G is cumbersome,
we demonstrate how to do it only for the two types case.
3. THE TWO TYPE CASE
Let bNi(V ) denote the number of type i employees with current lifetime payo¤
strictly less than V; i = 1; 2. Thus G(V ) = U + bN1(V ) + bN2(V ) for V > V = Vu: We
distinguish between three regions:
Region 1 is dened for V  V 1;
Region 2 (the intermediate region) where V 2 [V 1; V 11 ]:
Region 3 is dened for V  V 11 ;
In Region 1 type 1 rms post o¤ers V 2 [V ; V 1] and bN1(:) evolves according to
Claim 2(i) below. In this region there are no type 2 employees; i.e. d bN2 = 0: In Region
2 type 2 rms post o¤ers V 2 [V 1; V 11 ] and type 1 rms raise wages with tenure to
marginally reduce quits to such outside o¤ers. Claim 2(ii) describes the resulting bNi(:)
dynamics. In Region 3, type 2 rms post o¤ers with value V 2 [V 11 ; V ]; d bN1 = 0
as all type 1 employees have strictly lower payo¤s and Claim 2(iii) describes bN2(:) in
this region.
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Claim 2
Steady state turnover in a Market Equilibrium implies:
(i) In Region 1 [V ; V 1); bN2 = 0 and bN1 satises
d bN1
dV
=
h
U1F1(V )  [ + (1  1F1(V ))] bN1i dbt1
dV
subject to bN1(V ) = 0;
(ii) In Region 2 [V 1; V 11 ];
d bN1
dV
=

1U    bN1   2 Z V
V
[1  F2(x)]d bN1(x) dbt1
dV
; (16)
d bN1
dV
=
dbt1
dV
+
d bN2
dV
=
dbt2
dV
= U [1 + 2F2(V )]  [ + 2[1  F2(V )]]
h bN1 + bN2i ; (17)
subject to bN2(V 1) = 0:
(iii) In Region 3, (V 1
1
; V ]; d bN1=dV = 0 and
d bN2
dV
=
h
 2(1  F2(V )) + [ + 2(1  F2(V ))](N2   bN2)i dbt2
dV
;
where N2 = bN2(V ) and N2   bN2  1 G:
Proof
See Appendix A.
We can now identify equilibrium F: Given the constant prot condition
G(V0)bi(V0) = 
i for all V0 2 [V i 1; V i]
for each i, di¤erentiation with respect to V0 yields:
dG
dV
bi +Gdbi
dV
= 0 for all V0 2 [V i 1; V i]:
Now substitute out dbi=dV using Claim 1, substitute out dG=dV using claim 2 and
note G = 
i=[bi] (by the constant prot condition). Performing suitable algebraic
manipulations, Appendix B now determines the equilibrium job o¤er density, F 0; in
each region and so yields the following equilibrium characterization.
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Region 1: Equilibrium in this region implies job o¤er density:
dF
dV
=
 u00( bw1)
u0( bw1)2
 2 hp1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1i

1
: (18)
This and Claim 1 yield an autonomous di¤erential equation system for ( bw1; b1; F );
where the constant prot condition implies G = 
1=[b1]: This system thus deter-
mines equilibrium behaviour within Region 1. Note that the boundary V =V occurs
where G = U (i.e. bN1; bN2 = 0): The boundary with region 2, where V = V 1; occurs
where F = 1 (i:e:; where F1 = 1):
Region 2: Let  = d bN1=dV denote the density of type 1 employees in this region.
Appendix B establishes the equilibrium job o¤er density is
dF
dV
=
2q[u( bw1) u( bw2)]
u0( bw1)[p1  bw1 qb1]+ 2(p2  bw2)
2b32u0( bw2)
[
[
u0( bw1)2
 u00( bw1) ]b1[u( bw1) u( bw2)]
u0( bw1)[p1  bw1 qb1]2 +
[
u0( bw1)2
 u00( bw1) ]b1
[p1  bw1 qb1]  
[
u0( bw2)2
 u00( bw2) ]b2
[p2  bw2 qb2] ]+
[
u0( bw2)
 u00( bw2) ]
2b2[p2  bw2 qb2]
(19)
where q =  + (1  F ) is the employees exit rate from rm employment, and
 =

u( bw1)  u( bw2)
"
(p2   bw2)
2
b22   1
#
: (20)
Although (19) is monstrous, note that along with Claim 1 it yields an autonomous
di¤erential equation system for ( bw1; bw2; b1; b2; F ): Inspection of (19) establishes F 0
is singular at V 11 which signicantly complicates the analysis: We shall show below
there are two possible types of equilibrium behavior. In one case the density of type 1
employees, (V ); goes to zero as V ! V 1 1 and F 0 is then continuous across V 11 . In
the other case,  does not go to zero in this limit and instead there is a mass m2 > 0
of type 2 rms which post V = V 11 :
Note the boundary with Region 3, V = V 11 is identied by (9); i.e. when
V 11 = u(w
1
1 ) + 
Z V
V11
[V   V 11 ]dF (V ) (21)
where w11 = maxfw; p1g:
Region 3 [V 11 ; V ] : Equilibrium implies o¤er density
dF
dV
=
 u00( bw2)
u0( bw2)2
2
h
p2   bw2   [ + (1  F )]b2i

2
; (22)
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which (with Claim 1) determines the equilibrium dynamics ( bw2; b2; F ) in Region 3.2
The boundary V is identied where F = 1 (i:e: F2 = 1).
A Market Equilibrium can be identied using backward induction through each
of these regions. The di¤erential equations above describe equilibrium within each
region while at each boundary, the prot functions bi must be continuous and bwi
consistent with (13). For a given candidate V and corresponding candidate w; where
u(w) = V ; Appendix C describes in detail how we to use the above di¤erential
equation systems in order to backward iterate through each of the three regions.3
The iterative process stops when G = U; as V = V at this point: Thus for each V
the algorithms described in Appendix C identify a candidate equilibrium distribution
function F: But Lemma 1(a) further requires that V = Vu; i.e. the lowest value
contract yields the value of being unemployed. The candidate distribution function
F therefore describes a Market Equilibrium if and only if
V = u(b) + 
Z V
V
[x  V ]dF (x): (23)
The algorithm described in Appendix C uses a grid search over V so that the candidate
F described above also satises (23).
An important complication, however, is that the di¤erential equation describing
F 0 is singular at V 11 and F may contain a mass point there. Unfortunately this singu-
larity implies we cannot provide a general existence proof. Nevertheless our numerical
simulations always found an equilibrium, and sometimes multiple equilibria. We use
numerical examples to demonstrate the richness of possible equilibrium behaviours.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
To illustrate we assume CRRA utility function u(w) = w1 =(1 ) with  = 2:2
(see Lentz (2005) for justication) and set p1 = 100; p2 = 105 and b = 95: Thus
the surplus (pi   b) is twice as large in high productivity (type 2) rms than in low
productivity (type 1) rms: Using a year as the reference unit of time, we set  = 1
2Note this solution for F 0 is consistent with F 0 given by (19) above but with  = 0 and b2 =q
[p2   bw2]
2 in Region 3 (see Appendix B).
3there are two algorithms depending on the equilibrium case (see below).
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(an expected arrival rate of one outside o¤er per year) and  = 0:04 so that workers
discount at 4% per annum. The implied equilibrium unemployment rate is 3:8%.
Over a working lifetime, an employed worker expects to receive 25 outside o¤ers. As
unemployed workers receive o¤ers at the same rate as employed worker, this structure
suggests too long unemployment spells (expected duration of one year) and also too
short expected working lifetimes (1= = 25 years). Allowing di¤erent job arrival rates
for employed and unemployed workers and introducing Poisson job destruction shocks
(as in B=M) could be used to improve these ts but would needlessly complicate the
analysis.
The singularity in (19) yields two types of equilibria. We begin with a Case 1
equilibrium.
Case 1 Equilibria: A Mass Point m2 > 0 in F at V 11 .
Case 1 equilibria are dened as those Market Equilibria where the distribution of
job o¤ers, F; contains a mass point at V = V 11 : For ease of exposition, we illustrate
such an equilibrium using a numerical example; assume 1 = 2 = 0:5: Figure 2 de-
scribes the corresponding equilibrium baseline salary scales where, for greater clarity,
we revert to describing wages paid as functions of tenure.
Figure 2: Equilibrium Baseline Salary Scales (case 1)
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In this numerical example, 82% of all type 1 rms (i.e., mass m1 = 0:41) o¤er
t0 = 0 on the type 1 baseline salary scale. This wage/tenure contract yields lifetime
value V = Vu and corresponds to a starting wage w1(0) = 88:7; rising quickly to
w = 96:9 within 2 years tenure, and gradually asymptotes to marginal product p1 =
100 thereafter. The starting wage w1(0) is signicantly below b and reects a foot-
in-the-door e¤ect - unemployed workers accept a low starting wage as an investment
in higher future wages. All type 1 rms o¤er starting points t0  T1 on the type 1
baseline salary scale, where T1 = 1:7 years corresponds to starting wage w1(T1) = 95:2
and a contract which yields value V 1: Workers with (arbitrarily) long tenures earn
marginal product p1 and enjoy value V 11 :
Starting point t0 = 0 on the type 2 baseline salary scale yields V 1; while starting
point t0 = 1 month yields value V 11 : Thus type 2 contracts which o¤er starting point
t0 < 1 month yield expected lifetime values V0 2 [V 1; V 11 ]; and so correspond to
Region 2 in the previous section. The type 2 baseline salary scale is not continuous
at 1 month. Solving (13) with mass point m2 = 0:28 implies bw1(V 1 1 ) = 58:5 andbw1(V 1+1 ) = 79:1: Thus, the type 2 baseline salary scale implies an initial low wage
spell which lasts for one month. During this early spell, w2(0) = 55:5; rising to
w2 = 58:5 by the end of the month. After this probationaryspell, the wage jumps
to 79:1 and smoothly increases with tenure thereafter, asymptoting to w = 104:9:
This example thus illustrates the following behavior as consistent with equilibrium:
(i) Tenure e¤ects are large only at short tenures and possibly include very short
probationary spellswhere wages are initially low and increase by a discrete amount
at the end of the spell;
(ii) A job quit from a type 1 rm to a type 2 rm might involve a pay-cut. A worker
earning his/her marginal product at a type 1 rm (w = 100) will quit to any type 2
job o¤er with starting point t0  1 month; i.e. a type 2 contract with starting salary
no lower than 79:1. They accept such a low starting wage as wages along the type
2 baseline salary scale rise with tenure and attain a much higher level (w = 104:9).
Once employed at a type 2 rm, a worker never quits to a lower wage but will quit
to a type 2 rm o¤ering a higher wage. However, quit rates in type 2 rms quickly
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decrease with tenure as most type 2 contract o¤ers are skewed around the bottom
end of the type 2 baseline salary scale (56% of all type 2 rms o¤er t0 = 1 month).
(iii) The rst job of 50% of the workers is in a type 1 rm. It is not unreasonable
to think of type 1 jobs as dead-end jobs - wages compensate for the value of being
unemployed but o¤er relatively low wage promotion rates. Tenures at type 1 rms
are correspondingly small; the arrival rate of a type 2 job o¤er is 0:5 (i.e., an expected
wait of 2 years) whereupon the employee is likely to quit.
(iv) Turnover is not socially e¢ cient. Type 1 employees with V > V 1 (i.e. on salary
point exceeding 1:7 years) will reject some type 2 job o¤ers. For example a type 1
employee with arbitrarily long tenure (i.e., with V ' V 11 ) will reject a type 2 job
o¤er which includes a probationary spell (t0 < 1 month), even though the type 2 job
is more productive.
The critical property of a Case 1 equilibrium is that ; the density of type 1
employees, does not converge to zero as V ! V 1 1 : Inspection of (19) establishes
that if 9 0 as V ! V 1 1 then the limiting job o¤er density, denoted f c; is
lim
V!V1 1
F 0 = f c =
2

 u00(p1)
u0(p1)2

[ + (1  F (V 1 1 )]2:
A simple contradiction argument further establishes that if  9 0 as V ! V 1 1 ;
then F must contain a mass point at V 11 .
4 That mass point, m2; is then tied down
by the following boundary condition. Given an arbitrary choice for m2 > 0 at V 11 ;
(13) determines bw2 at V 1 1 and (20) then determines (V 1 1 ) > 0: The dynamics
in Region 2 for V < V 11 are then uniquely determined and so determine (:) for all
V 2 [V 1; V 11 ): But the additional boundary condition
 =
   ( + (1  F ))2=b2
u0( bw1)[p1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1] at V = V 1; (24)
4In region 3, Appendix B establishes
b22 = [p2   bw2]
2
for all V 2 (V11 ; V ]: If there is no mass point in F at V11 ; then bw2 is continuous across V11 : But
(20) then implies  = 0 at V = V1 1 which is the required contradiction:
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which follows from Claim 2(ii), ties down this degree of freedom inm2. The algorithm
for a Case 1 equilibrium, described in Appendix C, thus embeds an additional grid
search for equilibrium m2 so that (:) satises (24).
Case 2 Equilibria: F 0 continuous at V11 :
Case 2 equilibria are dened as those Market Equilibria where the density of job
o¤ers, F 0; is continuous across V = V 11 : We again describe such equilibria using a
numerical example: this time set 2 = 10 4: Figure 3 describes the corresponding
equilibrium baseline salary scales.
Figure 3: Equilibrium Baseline Salary Scales (case 2)
In this example 63% of type 1 rms (i.e. m1 = 0:63) o¤er t0 = 0 on the type 1
baseline salary scale. This contract yields value V = Vu with starting wage w1(0) =
72:4 rising to wage w1 = 96:0 after 2 years tenure. This wage then asymptotes to
marginal product, p1 = 100. The ceiling on type 1 starting o¤ers, T1; is extremely
high, exceeding 20 years tenure in this case.
The type 2 baseline salary scale is continuous, has high starting value w2(0) =
99:96 and limits to w = 100:03: Thus in contrast to the previous case, this exam-
ple demonstrates tenure e¤ects may be negligible in high productivity rms. The
intuition is most readily seen by rst considering the single type case where 1 = 1:
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If 1 = 1; a market equilibrium implies w = 99:96. The type 1 baseline salary
scale has the same starting wage w1(0) = 72:4 but a slightly lower limiting wage
w11 = w = 99:96. Introducing a few type 2 rms, 2 = 10
 4; implies type two rms
o¤er wages above 99:96 to attract (almost) all type 1 employees. The added competi-
tion across type 2 rms pulls w, the highest wage paid in the market, above p1: Type
1 rms respond to the added competition by raising wages with tenure until wages
reach marginal product.
A Case 2 equilibrium requires that the type 1 employment density  converges
quickly to zero as V ! V 1 1 ; specically =(V 11   V ) ! 0 as V ! V 1 1 : (19) then
implies the limiting density is the same density as implied by Region 3; i.e.
lim
V!V1 1
F 0 =
 u00( bw2)
u0( bw2)2
2
h
p2   bw2   [ + (1  F )]b2i

2


dF
dV

Region3
:
The equilibrium density of job o¤ers F 0 is then continuous across V 11 : Iterating back-
wards from V 11 nds that  grows exponentially (or rather  declines exponentially
as V ! V 11 ): Appendix C describes how to identify such an equilibrium, noting that
the solution must satisfy the boundary condition (24) for  at V 1:5
5. A Plethora of Equilibrium Congurations
We complete the discussion by describing Market Equilibria for a range of 2 and
so describe the set of possible Market Equilibrium congurations. We also establish
multiple equilibria may occur. For each 2; Table 1 reports the equilibrium case, the
range of wages o¤ered across each baseline salary scale and the implied mass points.
5The algebra suggests a third equilibrium might exist where  = 0(V   V11 ) and limF 0(V ) 2
[f; fc]: But  = 0(V   V11 ) and (37) requires limF 0(V ) = 3fc=8: The di¢ culty is that this limiting
density uniquely determines  for V in a neighbourhood of V11 : But that solution, with (19), does
not (generically) yield F 0(V )! 3fc=8. Our algorithms have not identied any such equilibria.
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Table 1: Possible Equilibrium Congurations
Row 2 w [w1;w
1
1 ] [w2;w
1
2 ] m1 m2 Case
1 0 99:959 [72:4;w] 0:63 -  
2 10 5 99:983 [72:4;w] [99:6;w] 0:63 0 2
3 10 4 100:033 [72:4;100] [98:9;w] 0:63 0 2
4 10 4 100:012 [72:4;100] [98:9;w] 0:63 2:7 10 5 1
5 0:1 103:776 [78:5;100] [69:5;w 0:64 0:081 1
6 0:5 104:857 [88:7;100] [55:5;w] 0:41 0:28 1
7 0:99 104:944 [88:6; 100] [65:2;w] 0:01 0:06 (0:48 at V ) 1
8 1 104:942 [65:9;w] (0:52 at V )  
Row 1 (2 = 0) describes the situation where there are only type 1 rms. Row
2 (2 = 10 5) describes an equilibrium where Region 3 is degenerate. This requires
that 2 is su¢ ciently small that w remains below p1 and both baseline salary scales
then converge to w < p1. Note that Lemma 1(c) implies only a Case 2 equilibrium can
exist when w < p1: Of course 2 this small (equal to 10 5) makes little quantitative
di¤erence to aggregate outcomes relative to the single type case (row 1).
Row 3 (2 = 10 4) describes a Case 2 equilibrium when w > p1 and was described
in detail above. Note that relative to row 2, the higher value of 2 implies greater
competition between type 2 rms which pulls w above p1: This implies region 3 is
no longer degenerate. For the same parameter values, a Case 1 equilibrium also
exists - see row 4. Thus multiple equilibria are possible. As 2 is so small, however,
the change in contract posting behavior by type 2 rms makes little quantitative
di¤erence to the market outcome.
The subsequent rows describe what happens as we increase 2; the proportion of
type 2 rms. Somewhat surprisingly, it is the Case 2 equilibrium (F 0 continuous)
which fails to survive. An increase in the number of type 2 rms increases the
competition for type 1 employees in the intermediate Region 2. Type 1 rms respond
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by raising wages more quickly with tenure and equilibrium implies 9 0 as V ! V 11 :
In these latter examples, only Case 1 equilibria (interior mass points) could be found.
Row 6 (2 = 0:5) was described in detail above, while row 7 (2 = 0:99) illustrates
what happens as 2 becomes large. In this case Region 1 becomes degenerate (i.e.
V 1 = V ); all type 1 rms o¤er the type 1 baseline salary scale. A mass of type 2
rms, 0:48, also o¤er V = V = V 2; in their case the type 2 baseline salary scale. As
2 ! 1; the mass of type 2 rms o¤ering V converges to 0:52 as described in the nal
row, while the mass point m2 at V 11 shrinks to zero. As ! 0 in the overlap region,
(19) implies the equilibrium density of job o¤ers F 0 ! f consistent with Region 3.
6. CONCLUSION
The model analyzed above leads to a rich pattern of behavior. Workers change
jobs from time to time, rms raise wages with tenure, workers with greater experience
tend to earn higher wages (via greater job shopping), workers with higher wages are
less likely to change job, the greater a workers tenure at a job the less likely a
job change, and some workers who change jobs su¤er a decline in wages. Obviously,
certain simplication were used in the analysis. Perhaps the most important of these
is that job destruction was ruled out and therefore movements from employment to
unemployment do not occur. Allowing for job destruction would much complicate
the analysis but is a doable task that we leave for the present.
There is a related (but signicantly di¤erent) literature that attempts to explain
why a workers wage is positively related to both job tenure and general work expe-
rience; e.g. Topel (1991), Altonji and Shakotko (1992), Altonji and Williams (1997),
Dustman and Meghir (2005), Kamborov and Manovskii (2005). The focus in this lit-
erature is on human capital accumulation; as a worker works at any given rm, both
general human capital and rm specic human capital may be accumulated. Given a
worker is rewarded according to both his/her rm specic human capital and general
human capital, wages will increase with both rm tenure and general work experience.
Determining by how much a workers wage growth is due to tenure and how much
to experience is the di¢ cult task addressed. Above we have shown that even when
there is no accumulation of human capital by workers (either rm specic or general),
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the desired patterns of behavior can be generated based only on a reasonable spec-
ication of market frictions. That is not to say that human capital accumulation is
unimportant. Rather identifying empirically between training e¤ects and pure tenure
e¤ects in a frictional labour market appears problematic. For example we have shown
with no human capital accumulation, that short probationary spells can arise where
new employees initially earn low wages, and on completion of that spell, wages jump
by a discrete amount. Here such spells reect pure rent extraction by the hiring rm.
Such spells might also arise when a rm o¤ers an initial training spell and the wage
increase at the end of the spell reects an increase in worker skills. An important
direction for future research is to embed human capital accumulation into this search
framework and so obtain identifying restrictions for empirical work.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Theorem 1.
Given productivity pi; an F satisfying A2 and any V0 2 [V ; V 1i ]; a rms optimal
contracting problem is
max
w(:)
Z 1
0
 (tjw(:))[pi   w(t)]dt
subject to (a) w(:)  0 and (b) V (0jw(:)) = V0; where  is dened by (3). For
ease of notation, let w(:) denote the optimal wage contract and fV (:);(:)g denote
a workers and a rms continuation payo¤s given this optimal contract.
The following extends the arguments given in B=C who describe the optimal con-
tract when F is also restricted to being continuously di¤erentiable and productivity
p > w: Throughout this proof, we suppose F only has a connected support (i.e.,
satises A2) and any pi: Corresponding to that F and pi is a w and (w1i ; V
1
i ;
1
i ) as
dened in the Theorem. We rst establish some preliminary results (Claims A1,A2).
Claim A1.
For any F satisfying A2, the optimal wage contract of a type i rm o¤ering starting
payo¤ V0 = V 1i is w(t) = w
1
i for all t  0:
Proof of Claim A1
Suppose rst pi  w, which implies w1i = w and V 1i = V : Consider then the
wage contract w(t) = w for all t: The Bellman equation (2) implies V (tjw(:)) = V
for all t; and so the worker never quits. As this contract also o¤ers full insurance
and pi > w implies not quitting is jointly e¢ cient, this contract is therefore jointly
e¢ cient. As this contract also extracts maximal employee rents - it o¤ers expected
lifetime payo¤ V0 = V 1i as required - it describes the rms optimal contract.
Consider instead pi < w which implies w1i = pi and V
1
i < V . In this case
the wage contract w(t) = pi for all t implies the worker earns (marginal) product pi
and (2) implies V (tjw(:)) = V 1i for all t: Being paid marginal product implies the
worker has e¢ cient quit incentives - the worker will quit if and only if the value of an
employment o¤er elsewhere exceeds the value of the current match. As this contract
is jointly e¢ cient and extracts maximal employee rents (given V0 = V 1i ) it describes
the rms optimal contract. This completes the proof of Claim A1.
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The next claim follows directly from B=C and so we omit the proof (see the proof
of Claim A1 in B=C but with V 1i instead of V ).
Claim A2
Given V0 2 [V ; V 1i ) optimality implies:
(a) Vu  V ()  V 1i for all   0; and so V satises the Bellman equation (2) subject
to the boundary condition that V is uniformly bounded.
(b) 0  ()  pi= for all   0:
Claim A2 establishes that the rms optimal contract solves the programming
problem
max
w0
Z 1
0
 (t)[pi   w(t)]dt (25)
where
:
 =  [ + (1  F (V ))] (26)
:
V = V   u(w)  
Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx; (27)
with starting values
 (0) = 1;V (0) = V0 (28)
and V is uniformly bounded, satisfying
Vu  V (t)  V 1i for all t: (29)
Following B=C, the following maximizes (25) but only subject to (26)-(28). The
solution nds (29) is automatically satised; i.e. it is never a binding constraint.
Dene the Hamiltonian
H =  [pi   w]  x [ + (1  F (V ))] + xV [V   u(w)  
Z V
V
[x  V ]dF (x)] (30)
where x ; xV denote the costate variables associated with the state variables  ; V:
The Maximum Principle implies the necessary conditions for a maximum are:
either w = 0 and @H=@w  0, xV =  0 (31)
or w > 0 and  + xV u0(w) = 0, xV = < 0 and 1=u0(w) =  xV = :
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and
:
x =  [p  w] + x [ + (1  F )]: (32)
Note, the standard approach also states a di¤erential equation for xV ; i.e.,

xV =
 @H=@V: We do not use this latter equation as H is not di¤erentiable in V (as F is
not di¤erentiable). Instead no discounting implies the additional constraint
H = 0 (33)
(e.g. p298, Leonard and Long (1992)) and this condition is su¢ cient to establish the
Theorem.
Assumption A1 implies w > 0 along the optimal path, and so (31) implies xV =
  =u0(w):Thus, H = 0 requires
0 = [pi   w]  x [ + (1  F (V ))] 
[V   u(w)   R V
V
[x  V ]dF (x)]
u0(w)
As (32) is a linear di¤erential equation, integration yields:
x (t) =
Z 1
t
e 
R s
t [+(1 F (V (x))]dx(p  w(s))ds+ A0e
R t
0 [+(1 F (V (x)))]dx
where A0 is the constant of integration. Note the rst term is the rms continuation
prot (t): Thus
x (t) = (t) + A0e
R t
0 [+(1 F (V (x)))]dx
and the H = 0 condition implies
0 = [pi   w] 
h
(t) + A0e
R t
0 [+(1 F (V (x)))]dx
i
[ + (1  F (V ))]
  [V   u(w)  
R V
V
[x  V ]dF (x)]
u0(w)
(34)
A contradiction argument now establishes A0 = 0: As  and V are uniformly bounded
(Claim A2), A0 6= 0 implies the second term in (34) grows exponentially as t ! 1:
Thus, (34) requires w ! 0 in this limit: However, A1 implies u(w)=u0(w) ! 0 in
this limit and so (34) must fail at large enough t; which is the required contradiction:
Thus, A0 = 0:
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We have x (t) = (t) and (32) now implies (6). Further, A0 = 0 in the equation
above and some rearranging yields (7). Using (7) to substitute out u(w) in (27) and
rearranging using (6) then yields (5).
All that is left is establishing the boundary conditions. Claim A2 implies  is
positive and (7) then implies w is increasing in tenure (see (11) in the text and the
discussion around it)). Hence, V is increasing in tenure. As V is uniformly bounded,
monotonicity implies V must converge to some limit value. Connected F implies
(w1i ; V
1
i ;
1
i ) is this unique stationary point of this system and so must describe the
optimal limiting contract.
Finally, note that V increasing implies V 2 [V0; V 1i ] for all t; and so this solution
also satises (29). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 1(c). 1   G(V ) describes the steady state number of workers
employed whose current lifetime utility is at least V: The proof is by contradiction
- suppose in equilibrium that 1   G has a mass  > 0 at V : Strictly positive prot
requires that any rm which in equilibrium o¤ers starting payo¤ V0 = V must have
productivity pi > w: Further, Claim A1 implies that any such rm enjoys steady state
prot ow 
i (V ) = (1 )[(pi w)=]: Consider instead a rm of that type but which
instead o¤ers w = w+" for some " > 0 and so obtains ow prot 
 = [(pi w ")=]:
As w < pi then  > 0 implies 
 > 
i (V ) for " small enough which contradicts the
denition of a market equilibrium. As 1   G cannot have a mass point at V ; then
Claim A1 implies F cannot have a mass point at V : This completes the proof of
Lemma 1c.
Proof of Lemma 2.
In this proof only, we extend the notation in the text by rewriting bwi(V ) asbw(V; pi): Thus bw(V; p) describes the wage paid in an optimal contract given value V
and rm productivity p: Similarly we rewrite bi(V ) as b(V; pi):
Thus, x an i; a V 2 [Vu; V 1i ) and consider any rm with productivity p  pi:
Lemma 2(a) requires showing that @ bw(V; p)=@p is strictly decreasing in p: Given the
extended notation, (13) in Claim 1 implies
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u( bw(V; p))+u0( bw(V; p))[p  bw(V; p)  [+(1 F )]b(V; p)] = V   Z V
V
[1 F (x)]dx:
For V xed, di¤erentiating partially with respect to p yields
@ bw(V; p)
@p
=
u0( bw)
 u00( bw) 1  [ + (1  F )]
@b(V;p)
@p
p  bw   [ + (1  F )]b :
To characterize @b(V; p)=@p; note that at the contract optimum
b(V; p)  (bt; p) = Z 1
=bt
	( jw)
	(btjw) [p  w( ; p)]d ;
wherew(:) denotes the optimal wage tenure contract of a type p rm and	( jw)=	(btjw)
is the probability the worker remains an employee at tenure  given current tenurebt(V; p): Optimality of that contract and the Envelope Theorem now yield
@b(V; p)
@p
=
Z 1
=bt
	( jw)
	(btjw) d ;
i.e., a marginal increase in p increases marginal prot at each future tenure should the
worker survive. Assumption A2 (connected F ); however, implies worker quit rates
strictly decrease with tenure for V < V 1i  V : Thus at tenures  > bt
	( jw) > e [+(1 F (V )][ bt]	(btjw)
and so
@b(V; p)
@p
>
Z 1
=bt e
 [+(1 F (V )][ bt]d = 1
 + (1  F (V )) :
This condition and the above establishes @ bw(V; p)=@p < 0 as required:
As Claim 1 implies @b=@V =  1=u0( bw); Lemma 2(b) follows from part (a) and
that u(:) is strictly concave. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Claim 2.
Region 1: For V < V 1; steady state turnover on baseline salary scale 1, over
arbitrarily short period of time  > 0; implies
U1F1(V ) = [ bN1(V )  bN1(V   [dV1(bt1)=dt])]
+ bN1(V )[ + [1  1F1(V )]] + o():
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where the left hand side describes the inow of type 1 workers with payo¤ less than
V;and the right hand side describes outow - the rst term describes those whose
tenure rises above bt1(V ); the second is the outow due to exiting the labor market, or
receiving a better outside o¤er. Taking the limit ! 0 implies the condition stated.
Region 2: For V 2 [V 1; V 11 ]; steady state turnover on baseline salary scale 1, over
arbitrarily short period of time  > 0; implies
U1 = [ bN1(V )  bN1(V   [dV1(bt1)=dt])]
+ bN1(V )+ Z V
V
d bN1(x)[2(1  F2(x))] + o():
where the left hand side describes the inow of workers onto baseline salary scale
one with payo¤ less than V , and the right hand side describes the outow due to
increasing tenure, exiting the labor market or receiving a better outside o¤er from a
type 2 rm. Rearranging and letting ! 0 implies the rst condition stated.
Steady state turnover for all employed workers with payo¤ no greater than V 2
[V 1; V
1
1 ] implies
U[1 + 2F2(V )] = [ bN1(V )  bN1(V   [dV1(bt1)=dt])]
+[ bN2(V )  bN2(V   [dV2(bt2)=dt])]
+[ bN1(V ) + bN2(V )][ + 2(1  F2(V ))]
where the left hand side describes the inow, the right hand side describes the outow
due to tenure e¤ects (both types), exiting the labor market and receiving an outside
o¤er greater than V: Rearranging and letting ! 0 implies the second condition.
Region 3: For V 2 [V 11 ; V ]; steady state turnover on baseline salary scale 2 implies
[N2   bN2] = [ bN2(V )  bN2(V   [dV2(bt2)=dt])]
+[U +N1 + bN2(V )]2[1  F2(V )] + o()
where the left hand side describes the outow of type 2 workers with payo¤ greater
than V; and the right hand side describes the inow - those whose tenure rises abovebt2(V );and those who receive an outside o¤er greater than V: Rearranging, noting that
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U + N1 + N2 = 1; and letting  ! 0 implies the condition stated. This completes
the proof of Claim 2.
APPENDIX B - Identifying Equilibrium F 0.
It is convenient to consider the regions in reverse order.
Region 3. V 2 [V 1
1
; V ]
As dG=dV = d bN2=dV in this region, equilibrium requires solving
G
db2
dV
+
d bN2
dV
b2 = 0 for all V 2 [V 11 ; V ];
with Gb2 = 
2. Now Claim 1 implies db2=dV =  1=u0( bw2) and rearranging the
above implies
d bN2
dV
=

2
u0( bw2)b22 :
Noting N2   bN2  1 G; Claim 2(iii) implies
d bN2
dV
=
h
   
2
b2 [ + (1  F )]
i
u0( bw2)[p2   bw2   [ + (1  F )]b2] ;
over this region. Equating these two expressions and simplifying yields
b22 = [p2   bw2]
2 :
As b2 is di¤erentiable, di¤erentiating wrt V implies
2b2db2
dV
=  d bw2
dV

2

:
Using claim 1 and (14) to substitute out db2=dV and d bw2=dV then implies F 0 given
by (22).
Region 2. V 2 [V 1; V 11 ]:
Equilibrium in this region requires
G
db2
dV
+ [
d bN1
dV
+
d bN2
dV
]b2 = 0 for all V 2 [V 1; V 11 ];
and Gb2 = 
2. As Claim 1 implies db2=dV =  1=u0( bw2); and letting  = d bN1=dV;
the previous equation implies
34
 =

2
u0( bw2)b22   d
bN2
dV
:
Noting that bN1+ bN2  G U; U = =(+ ) and G = 
2=(b2); Claim 2(ii) implies
d bN2
dV
=
   [ + (1  F )] 
2
b2   u0( bw1)[p1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1]
u0( bw2)[p2   bw2   [ + (1  F )]b2] : (35)
Now use this condition to substitute out d bN2=dV in the previous equation: Simplifying
further by using (7), which implies
u( bw1)+u0( bw1)[p1  bw1  [+(1 F )]b1] = u( bw2)+u0( bw2)[p2  bw2  [+(1 F )]b2];
then implies  must satisfy:
 =

u( bw1)  u( bw2)
"
(p2   bw2)
2
b22   1
#
which establishes (20) in the text.
Equation (16) in Claim 2(ii) implies  satises
[u0( bw1)[p1  bw1 [+(1 F (V ))]b1]] = 1U    bN1   2 Z V
V
[1  F2(x)]d bN1(x) ;
Di¤erentiating wrt V and noting that (7) implies
d
dV
h
u0( bwi)[pi   bwi   [ + (1  F (V ))]bi]i =  + (1  F )  u0( bwi)d bwi
dV
(36)
then yields
1

d
dV
=
u0( bw1)d bw1dV   2[ + (1  F )]
u0( bw1)[p1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1] : (37)
Finally, di¤erentiate (20) with respect to V to obtain d=dV: Then set this equal
to d=dV (given by (37)). Using (7), Claim 1 and (14) to substitute out the resulting
d bw1=dV; d bw2=dV; and db2=dV terms yields (19).
Region 1 V 2 [V ; V 1].
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The arguments used to establish F 0 in Region 3 also apply to Region 1: In partic-
ular, note that the solutions for F 0 have identical structures.
APPENDIX C - The Algorithms.
There are two algorithms, one for each type of equilibrium. We describe the Case
1 algorithm rst.
Case 1 Algorithm: A Mass Point m2 at V 11 :
Fix a w 2 (p1; p2) and set V = u(w)=; 
2 = (p2 w)=:6 In Region 3, set initial
values ( bw2; b2; F ) = (w; (p2 w)=; 1) at V = V ;and backward iterate for ( bw2; b2; F )
using the di¤erential equations (14),(6), and (22). The iteration stops when:
V = u(p1) + 
Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx
which identies V 11 :We then move to Region 2. Let ( bw+2 ; b+2 ; F+) denote the values
of ( bw2; b2; F ) thus obtained at V 11 :
Fix an m2 2 (0; F+) and let ( bw 2 ; b 2 ; F ) denote the values of ( bw2; b2; F ) at
V 1 1 :The mass point implies F
  = F+  m2; b 2 = b+2 as b2 is continuous and (13)
implies bw 2 solves:
u( bw 2 )+u0( bw 2 )[p2  bw 2  [+(1 F )]b 2 ] = u( bw+2 )+u0( bw+2 )[p2  bw+2  [+(1 F+)]b+2 ]
(38)
The implied value of  > 0 is given by (20) and must satisfy  < G: If  > G then
pick a smaller m2:
Thus, for given choices (w;m2) we have initial values ( bw 2 ; b 2 ; F ) at V 11 and
also initial values ( bw1; b1) = (p1; 0): The text denes the di¤erential equation system
( bw1; bw2; b1; b2; F ) over Region 2. The problem is that (19) for F and (14) for bw1 are
both singular at V 11 : Examination of (19) with  bounded away from zero implies
lim
V!V1 1
F 0 = f c =
2

 u00(p1)
u0(p1)2

[ + (1  F )]2:
6there cannot be a case 1 equilibrium for w  p1:
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Using lHopitals rule on (14) implies
lim
V!V1 1
d bw1
dV
= lim
V!V1 1

u0( bw1)
 u00( bw1)

F 0(V )db1
dVh
 d bw1
dV
  [ + (1  F )]db1
dV
i (39)
where Claim 1 implies db1
dV
=  1=u0( bw1):This yields a quadratic equation for limV!V1 1 d bw1=dV:
As one root implies limV!V1 1 d bw=dV < 0; which is inconsistent with optimality.
There is only one relevant solution
lim
V!V1 1
d bw1
dV
=
[ + (1  F )]
2u0(p1)
+
s
[ + (1  F )]
2u0(p1)
2
+

f c
 u00(p1)

:
Thus, in Region 2, we can backward iterate from V = V 11 with start values
( bw1; bw2; b1; b2; F ) = (p1; bw 2 ; 0; b 2 ; F ) using the di¤erential equations (14); (6);and
(19) in the text; but for the rst iteration use the above limiting solutions for
dF=dV; dbw1=dV: The resulting system is numerically stable.
Associated with the iterated path in Region 2 is a path for G = 
2=(b2) and
for  given by (20). The iteration stops as soon as either  = G or G = U and let
V 1 denote the corresponding value of V: If the iteration stops as  = G; then set 01
equal to the current value of F: If instead the iteration stops because G = U; then set
01 =
+ 

u0( bw1)[p1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1]:
We now move to Region 1 with start values ( bw1; b1; F ) obtained from the end
of Region 2 and set 
1 equal to the current value of Gb1. If Region 2 ended as
 = G (and so G > U); we backward iterate ( bw1; b1; F ) using (14); (6),and (18) until
G = U: When this stopping point occurs, let V denote the corresponding value of V:
If Region 2 ended because G = U then Region 1 is degenerate and V = V 1:
Given the F (:) obtained by the above iterative process, let b0 denote the solution
to
V = u(b0) + 
Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx: (40)
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By construction, the above identies a Market Equilibrium if b = b0 and 1 = 01 (see
footnote ??): For given parameters 1 and b; the algorithm uses a grid search over w
and m2 so that 01 = 1 and b
0 = b: A computer program using Gauss is available
from the authors.
Case 2 Algorithm: F 0 continuous across V 11 :
Fix a w 2 (b; p2) and set V = u(w)=; 
2 = (p2   w)=: If w > p1; Region 3 is
non-degenerate. In that case, set initial values ( bw2; b2; F ) = (w; (p2   w)=; 1) and
backward iterate the di¤erential equations (14),(6),and (22) until
V = u(p1) + 
Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx
which identies V 11 : The current values ( bw2; b2; F ) then provide the start values for
( bw2; b2; F ) in Region 2. If instead w  p1;then Region 3 is degenerate (as V 11 = V )
and Region 2 starts with values ( bw2; b2; F ) = (w; (p2   w)=; 1):
In Region 2, at V 11 ; ( bw2; b2; F ) has the above start values and set ( bw1; b1) =
(w11 ;
1
1 ) as dened in Theorem 1. Again the problem is (19) for F and (14) forbw1 are both singular at V 11 : Unfortunately, the approach above, using the limiting
analytic solutions for F 0 for the rst iteration, does not yield a stable numerical
system. Instead we integrate up analytically and so remove those singularities.
Appendix B shows, in Region 2, that the constant prot condition implies equa-
tion (20), i.e.,
 =

u( bw1)  u( bw2)
"
(p2   bw2)
2
b22   1
#
and  evolves according to d=dV given by (37). Equilibrium F 0 was obtained by
di¤erentiating the equation above to get d=dV and setting it equal to d=dV in (37)
and then solving for F 0:
A a di¤erent approach is to integrate up d=dV in (37) and set that solution equal
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to  above. Integrating up (37) yields 7
u0( bw1)[p1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1] = Z V11
V
[ + (1  F (x))](x)dx: (41)
which, given  in the previous equation, yields an integral equation determining F ,
rather than a di¤erential equation describing F 0:
Thus over Region 2, the Case 2 algorithm uses the di¤erential equations
dbi
dV
=   1
u0( bwi)
to determine the bi (with start values described above); and level equations
u( bwi) + u0( bwi)[pi   bwi   [ + (1  F )]bi] = V    Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx:
 =

u( bw1)  u( bw2)
"
(p2   bw2)
2
b22   1
#
u0( bw1)[p1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1] = Z V11
V
[ + (1  F (x))] (x)
(V )
dx;
which determine the bwi; ;and F respectively. Note, there are no singularities. Given
an (extremely) small starting value for (V 11   h) =  > 0; where h is the step size;
this system can be iterated backwards from V 11 for ( bw1; bw2; b1; b2; F; ). The itera-
tion stops as soon as either  = G; or G = U , and let V 1 denote the corresponding
value of V: If the iteration stops as  = G; then set 01 equal to the current value of
F: If instead the iteration stops as G = U; then set
01 =
+ 

u0( bw1)[p1   bw1   [ + (1  F )]b1]:
7A simpler derivation notes that steady state turnover for type 1 employees implies
1U = N1 + 
Z V11
V
2[1  F2(x)](x)dx:
Using this in (16); noting also that 2[1 F2(x)] = 1 F for V > V 1; yields (41) directly. Note this
derivation does not require F di¤erentiable.
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We then move to Region 1 with start values ( bw1; b1; F ) obtained from the end of
Region 2. Given the F (:) obtained, again let b0 denote the solution to
V = u(b0) + 
Z V
V
[1  F (x)]dx:
By construction the above identies a Market Equilibrium if b = b0 and 1 = 01: For
given parameters 1; b; the algorithm uses a grid search over w and  so that 01 = 1
and b0 = b: A computer program (using Gauss) is available from the authors.
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